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Non-Technical Summary
Weaned on models of competitive equilibrium, economists instinctively tend to invoke the
virtues of competition in a wide variety of situations.  But this usually unreflective appeal to
competitive forces has received remarkably little empirical testing and verification, and even when it
has been tested, the evidence has been rather weak.  We speculate that the paucity of empirical support
is a result of the difficulty of observing these forces at work in equilibrium, or at least in the rather
stable conditions of most economies in which such studies have been conducted.
In this paper, we exploit the quasi-experiment offered by the Russian economy in transition to
avoid the endogeneity problems that plague other analyses and to observe the potentially large
efficiency effects that may be present in enterprises inherited from the socialist period.  Our analysis
embraces a variety of dimensions of competitive pressure, including not only domestic market
structure at the national level, but also import competition, regional variation of product markets,
transportation infrastructure, and labor market competition.  We study the time path of the impact of a
competitive shock – the abrupt liberalization of prices, entry, imports, and labor mobility – in January
1992, and examine non-linearities in the effect of each of these competitive forces.  Our data set
permits us to investigate virtually any measure of product market competition that has been proposed,
and our results are strongly robust across alternative specifications.
We first test for determinants of firm survival, finding that foreign and domestic product
market competition and good transportation infrastructure have a negative effect on survival,
consistent with competition being a screening device.  Demand shocks have the expected effects:
industry and regional growth and relative price changes all increase the probability of survival.  Initial
conditions also matter, as higher initial profitability, exporting activity, and size increase the
probability of survival, while military-industrial complex affiliation lowers it.  Foreign joint venture
and 100 percent private ownership lowers the probability of survival relative to other ownership types.
The total factor productivity results provide strong evidence that domestic product market
competition, import competition, and local labor market competition have strong positive effects on
efficiency.  The impact of liberalization appears only gradually in the domestic product market, taking
about four years to attain about 90 percent of the long-run value, but we find no such lags with respect
to import competition or labor market competition.  Domestic product market and labor market
competition show increasing marginal effects, while the marginal effect of import competition is
decreasing.  Local product market competition has a greater effect on efficiency than national
competition, suggesting that markets are geographically segmented.  Former members of Soviet-era
production associations appear to be competing with one another rather than colluding.  Better
transport infrastructure appears to turn potential product market competition into actual competition,
while at the same time reducing firms’ monopsony power on the labor market by facilitating worker
mobility across municipalities.
Our results suggest that downsizing firms have more difficulty maintaining productivity in
industries and regions with more negative demand shocks.  Positive price shocks appear to have
cushioned firms from having to adjust.  Initial conditions are significant as well; higher initial
profitability and being an exporter raise productivity, while the extent of exporting activity and
military-industrial complex affiliation lower it.  We also find that non-state firms outperform state
enterprises, even after controlling for selection bias in the determination of ownership.
The results have implications for industrial policy.  A reduction in import barriers and
geographic market segmentation, the latter accomplished through investment in transportation
infrastructure and elimination of interregional administrative trade barriers, should stimulate industrial
productivity.3
1.  Introduction
Although the virtuous consequences of competitive product and factor markets for enterprise
efficiency are fundamental tenets in most economists’ thinking, the empirical case for these beliefs is
relatively weak.  Most empirical studies of firm and industry performance have focussed on some
measure of profitability as the outcome variable, rather than efficiency, but there is little necessary
connection between the two.  The relatively few studies examining efficiency have mostly produced
rather weak results with respect to the effects of competition, and they have been hampered by data
and identification problems.
One line of inquiry has analyzed firms or industries in developed capitalist economies and
undertaken static, cross-section comparisons of operating performance or productivity across
observations with fixed market environments (e.g., Vining and Boardman, 1992; Blanchflower and
Machin, 1996; Berger and Hannan, 1998).  Such studies, while informative, face difficulties in
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity of market structure.  Demsetz
(1973) and Peltzman (1977) argue, for instance, that market structure is endogenous in that better
performance of some firms may lead to higher concentration, so that there is no necessary relationship
between the two variables in a cross-section.
A second type of investigation has used panel data to identify the impact of variables of
interest on firm efficiency through their intertemporal changes (e.g., Nickell, 1996).  A problem with
these studies is that data availability has typically limited them to examine only small numbers of
firms spread across a wide variety of industries.  In the stable economies of the West, there have been
few opportunities to analyze firms that have undergone substantial changes in their market
environments, particularly large numbers of firms undergoing diverse experiences of such changes
simultaneously.
A final problem with most of the studies is that the potential efficiency gains due to
competition that may be observable by the researcher are rather small, insofar as most of the
economies where such studies are undertaken are dominated by "workably competitive" markets, so
that the general environment may still exert a disciplining force even if the particular conditions facing
the firm do not.  Natural monopolies in the West, after all, usually operate in competitive markets for
managers, labor, and most other factors; they can avail themselves of the latest technologies,
organizational innovations, and managerial techniques; their performance can be compared at least
along some dimensions with neighboring competitive firms; and instances of gross malfeasance can be
publicly evaluated and remedied through a democratic process.  All of these factors would seem to go
quite some distance towards mitigating inefficiencies associated with monopoly power.
The situation in Russia, the testing ground for this paper, stands in stark contrast. Russia’s
“product market structure” at the beginning of the transition was determined by decisions that had
been made by Soviet central planners rather than by market forces.  Those decisions were motivated to
a considerable extent by the need to monitor and control the production units and by political
considerations, which tended to skew choices of location, scale and integration; economic efficiency
was frequently secondary.
1  Moreover, prices and wages were controlled, output quantities and types
were set by plan, sales were virtually guaranteed, soft budget constraints prevented bankruptcy, and
firms could grow (or shrink) only by order of the central authority.  Although there is some debate
over the extent to which the planning system resulted in monopolized or highly concentrated sectors, it
is clear that the Soviet system, relative to market economies, had very few small firms and very low
rates of entry and exit.
2
This ossified industrial organization was suddenly liberalized on January 1, 1992, when
prices, foreign trade, supply arrangements, labor mobility and the entry of new businesses were
simultaneously freed.  Where before there was little or no effective competition in any product or
factor markets, suddenly Russian firms were forced to compete with each other and with new foreign
competitors, while demand became more fickle and budget constraints became harder.  Thus, Russia
presents an unusual quasi-experiment where we may test whether an exogenously determined market
                                                          
1 Kornai (1992) provides a detailed discussion of the goals of central planners, including the implications
concerning some aspects of industrial structure.
2 Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova (1994); Brown, Ickes, and Ryterman (1994); and Brown and Brown
(1999).4
structure has an effect on firm efficiency.  We may also examine the time pattern of adjustment to the
liberalization shock: how quickly the increased competition may have improved enterprise
productivity.
The shock of liberalization was not only unexpected, but it also hit a set of enterprises that had
been operating far from the production frontier when the "big bang" policies took effect.  The plant
and equipment, labor force, managerial skills, organizational capital, and modes of operating of these
firms were built up during a period when there was nothing approaching a competitive market
environment, essentially no private ownership, and efficiency and profits were not primary objectives.
After the competitive shock hit, therefore, Russian firms have the potential to exhibit large changes as
they restructure along many dimensions and re-orient their objectives from the state towards the
market.  For the researcher, the situation holds out the possibility for observing substantial differences
in behavior.
Some peculiarities of Russian geography suggest that it may be fruitful to investigate some
regional dimensions of market structure.  By far the largest country in the world, Russia is
characterized by widely scattered industries frequently separated by vast distances and connected by
poor infrastructural networks.  While the possibility that product market scope should be defined by
region as well as industry has been considered in research on U.S. market structure (e.g., Weiss and
Pascoe, 1986), the distances and transport and communication costs appear to pose much greater
obstacles to unifying markets in Russia.
The geographic argument also has implications for factor markets, in particular for labor.
While in principle it is clear that monopsony power may create slack that permits x-inefficiency
precisely analogously to the slack under monopoly power, there have been no empirical studies of the
relationship, possibly due to the fact that Western economies show rather little labor market
concentration (Boal and Ransom, 1997).  Concentrated labor markets – in the limit, one-company
towns – are much more common in Russia, suggesting the possibility that monopsony power may
indeed be a significant factor in cushioning firm behavior.
A small number of other studies have examined the impact of competition in Russia and other
transitional economies, but the research on which we now report has several distinct advantages in
terms of the size and coverage of the data set, the time span of observations on each firm, and the
availability of a variety of measures of market structure and competition.  The work of Earle and
Estrin (1995 and 1998), for instance, relied on a survey of about 200 firms (with complete
information) carried out in July 1994, which was not long after the competitive shock, their measures
of product market concentration were highly aggregated – as were their indicators of import
penetration – and their data did not permit them to estimate total factor productivity.  Perhaps these
data limitations explain their finding that competition appeared to have little role in accounting for
enterprise performance as of mid-1994, although they did find suggestive patterns associated with the
geographic scope of product markets – which we follow up in this paper.  In a study of 211 Mongolian
enterprises, Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (1999) find strong effects of competition, certainly much
larger than in studies of Western economies such as Nickell (1996) and Berger and Hannan (1998).
Unfortunately, however, the data in the Mongolian study span only a short period after liberalization
finished, the measure of competition/concentration is limited to the firm's (imputed) market share
(based on managers' reports) at the end of that period, and the data do not permit an examination of
other aspects of competition.  Jones, Klinedinst, and Rock (1998) use market share as the
concentration measure in the firm's industry in a study of TFP in 247 Bulgarian enterprises, and
Konings (1997) relies on qualitative measures from a survey of managers in 346 Bulgarian,
Hungarian, and Romanian companies.  Li (1997, Table 2) provides estimates of the impact on TFP
growth of the ratio of output price growth to material input price growth (a proxy for change in market
power) for 272 Chinese enterprises.
By contrast, the panel data set we use for estimation purposes is quite comprehensive,
including 75 percent of total employment in Russian industry in 1992, the year of the liberalization
shock, and covering the seven years from 1992 to 1998.
3  Since we have nearly the entire population
                                                          
3 Some enterprises are excluded from the regression analysis due to missing values or because they have fewer
than 100 employees. The percentage of total industrial employment included in the database in 1993 that is used5
of medium- and large-size industrial enterprises, including information on their exact locations and
disaggregated five-digit industries, we can use much more precise measures of market structure than
those available to other researchers in Russia or in many other countries.  The size and scope of the
database, as well as the unusual characteristics of Russia permit us to investigate several geographic
dimensions of competitive pressure and to examine competition in local labor markets.  Our data also
contain useful controls and instruments, and much better and more disaggregated information on
import competition than was heretofore available.  We use this rich database to trace out the impact of
several dimensions of market competition and other factors on firm-level TFP.
In the following section, we develop more fully our motivation for examining a number of
dimensions of the relationship between firm efficiency and market competition in Russia.  Next, we
discuss our econometric framework, data, and measures of key variables.  Finally, we present
estimation results followed by a conclusion.
2.  Dimensions of the Competition-Efficiency Relationship
Our basic approach in this paper, as we have suggested above, is to exploit the sudden shock
of liberalization in a context where market structure was exogenously determined and where firms
might exhibit large differences in behavior.  We use our detailed information on the quasi-
experimental situation in Russia to investigate a number of particular dimensions of the competition-
efficiency relationship.  A first set of dimensions concerns geography.  While industrial organization
analysts and regulatory agencies have devoted much attention to the question of the appropriate
definition of the market according to industrial or product classification (e.g., Pittman and Werden,
1990), there has been relatively little research on the implications of geographic segmentation of
product markets for enterprise efficiency.  Studies such as Weiss (1972) and Scherer et al (1975) have
examined the geographic issue for some developed market economies, but their motivation was the
impact not on efficiency, but rather on profits.  The few empirical studies of the impact of competitive
pressures on firm efficiency have tended to focus exclusively on national product market
concentration as the variable of interest (Caves and Barton, 1990; Nickell, 1996), although one
exception is Berger and Hannan (1998), who define product markets as standard metropolitan
statistical areas in their analysis of retail banking.
In this paper, we take a much broader approach to the role of geography in affecting the level
of competitive pressure exerted on firms.  Our motivation is the tremendous size and uneven
infrastructure of Russia, suggesting that product markets may be much more differentiated
geographically than in the standard setting.  We use our data to measure regional as well as national
product market concentration, therefore, but we also try to take into account the fact that the
geographic scope of markets is likely to vary according to the nature of the product.  For this reason,
we construct mixed measures of national and regional product market structure, where the mixing
variable is meant to capture the weight attached to each geographic level in the level of competitive
pressure.
Foreign competition, which was also abruptly liberalized at the beginning of 1992, is another
dimension of product market pressure.  The possibility that imports may function as a disciplinary
device, improving firm efficiency, has been studied by a number of authors, including Carlsson
(1972); Saunders (1980); Geroski and Jacquemin (1981); DeGhellink, Geroski, and Jacquemin (1988);
and Caves and Barton (1990).  Although these studies tend to find that there is indeed an import
discipline effect, particularly on domestic monopolists, they are open to the criticism that firm
efficiency, imports, and domestic competition are all jointly determined.  We use the abrupt import
liberalization in Russia to disentangle this simultaneity problem, under the argument that the process
generating imports in the immediate post-liberalization period was exogenous with respect to the
subsequent evolution of Russian enterprise performance.  Previous studies of such large events appear
to be confined to the impact of imports on profitability (e.g., Esposito and Esposito, 1971; or Geroski,
1982).  Import competition may be especially effective in Russia due to the substantial quality deficit
of most Soviet-made goods as well as the possibly more elastic supply responsiveness of imports
relative to domestic competitors.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for calculating the market structure measures is 91 percent.  These figures are calculated by dividing the sum of
employment for the firms in our sample by the total industrial employment reported in Goskomstat (1996).6
Another dimension of international markets concerns participation in export markets.  There
are a number of arguments why exporting firms may perform better than non-exporters. Aw, Chen,
and Roberts (1997) argue that international markets may be a tougher screen for sorting out high
productivity from low productivity firms.  Sabel and Prokop (1996) claim that the discipline of having
to conform to a set of international quality standards, rather than competition, corporate governance or
other factors, is the prime agent encouraging restructuring.  Exporters may also be more potentially
viable than non-exporters since they are already producing goods that have a market, consistent with
the finding in Repkine and Walsh (1998) that East European enterprises exporting to the European
Union have increased output during the transition, while other firms have decreased output.  In the
standard setting of a stable market economy, the problem with investigating the impact of export
orientation is even more acute than with other dimensions of a firm’s market environment, as
exporting capabilities and decisions are clearly endogenous.  Once again, Russia provides a useful
quasi-experimental setting for investigating the issue, as export transactions were tightly controlled
during the socialist period in Russia, and then liberalized at the same time as were imports.
Previous empirical research on the relationship between competition and firm performance has
focussed exclusively on the product market, ignoring factor markets.
4  There Boal and Ransom (1997),
in a recent survey of the literature on labor market monopsony, for instance, report no studies of the
impact of labor market concentration on efficiency or productivity.  Yet market power with respect to
some factor of production may worsen incentives for managers just as readily, and for precisely
analogous reasons, as power in the product market.  Perhaps the lack of research reflects the difficulty
in identifying factor markets where concentration is sufficiently high to warrant investigation and
where comparisons can readily be drawn with otherwise similar firms facing competitive factor
market conditions.  Again, Russian geography provides us with an interesting setting for investigating
this question, as a considerable number of local labor markets are dominated by a single or small
number of employers.  Thus, we can exploit the peculiar spatial conditions of Russian markets to
estimate the impact of local labor market power on firm performance.
A further aspect of the geography of both product and factor market competition concerns
transportation infrastructure.  If a firm's regional product market has poor transportation connections,
then it will be able to achieve some local monopoly power, just as a firm in a local labor market with
poor links to neighboring localities may have local monopsony power.  Poor transportation
infrastructure functions as a barrier to entry by competitors.  The large size and highly variable
infrastructure of the Russian Federation suggest that transportation costs may be quite significant for
some regions of the country, and that these should be taken into account together with conventional
measures of market structure.
The impact of competition on efficiency may vary in the time dimension.  In the short run,
there may be relatively little that firms can do to restructure and improve their performance, but as
they have more time to adjust, the benefits of competition may become more apparent.  While much of
the theoretical analysis of competition and firm behavior is implicitly cast in the long run, assuming
away adjustment costs, there appears to be little or no research that attempts to measure the time path
of the effects.  We exploit the existence of several years of performance data after the initial
competitive shock to trace out the impact on firm behavior – from initial reaction to longer run
adjustment.
We are also concerned with the intensity dimension of the competition-efficiency relationship:
does the magnitude and perhaps even the direction of the marginal competition effect vary with the
level of competition?  To start with, while most economists assume that competition tends to improve
performance in most circumstances, it is sometimes claimed that the effect may be negative, either
because it prevents firms from accumulating rents that can be used for research and development,
according to Schumpeter (1950) and Nelson and Winter (1982), or – in the transition context –
because of the difficulty of financing the high adjustment costs associated with restructuring,
according to Ickes, Ryterman, and Tenev (1995).  Furthermore, Gaddy and Ickes (1999) argue that
firms that are closer to being "competitive" are more likely to restructure than those further away,
since the effort needed is smaller.
                                                          
4 An exception concerns managerial labor markets7
The problem with these arguments, however, is that the key variables are not easily
observable, and we would add a somewhat different reason for possible non-monotonicity:  the
difficulties experienced by firms needing to reduce the scale of their operations.  Down-sizing may
necessitate large-scale layoffs of workers and shedding of assets, both of which may be costly,
particularly where workers have contracts or the state pressures firms to maintain employment and
where secondary markets for assets function poorly, all of which conditions hold in Russia.  Compared
to other firms, a firm facing a larger fall in product demand may find it more difficult to maintain
productivity.  If the liberalization shock was very large for some firms in Russia, in the sense that they
need to restructure and downsize, then such firms may exhibit lower productivity.  This suggests that
the effects of increased competition may be nonmonotonic, positive at low levels but negative at
higher ones.
Moreover, the ability of a contracting firm to maintain productivity is also a function of its
environment.  In regions and industries that are growing more rapidly, a firm hit by a large negative
shock will find it easier to reduce employment and to sell its plant and equipment, as factor markets
for labor and used capital would be more buoyant compared to an environment of decline.  Industrial
output has declined steeply in Russia during our sample frame, even more than in most transition
economies (Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh, 1996), so these considerations may be important for
understanding differences in firm performance.  At the same time, they carry lessons for understanding
productivity and competition in declining firms and sectors more generally.
A related issue concerns the particularly severe restructuring difficulties faced by the military-
industrial complex (MIC).  Firms in this sector experienced an enormous fall in demand for their
military output in the early 1990s, but they have had little success in converting to civilian production
(Earle and Komarov, 2000).  Perhaps this is not surprising, as defense conversion is a difficult task
even in well-functioning economies like that in the United States.  But it implies that military firms
may have lower productivity, as they cope with the demand shock and particular restructuring
difficulties.  A counter-argument is that such firms were privileged under the socialist regimes and
may have started the transition with better technology than other firms.  Which of these effects
dominates is an empirical question that we are able to address with our data.
For firms operating far from the production frontier, the real question may involve survival,
and indeed one of the most important effects of a sudden increase in competitive pressures may be to
drive incumbent firms out of business.  Research by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and others
has begun to establish some of the basic patterns in firm births, deaths, and longevity, but the primary
focus has been on issues of firm size and life cycle, thus on “normal firm turnover,” and there has been
no investigation of the impact of competitive shocks on survival probability.  This neglect may be
partly due to the more general neglect of efficiency effects of competition, but it is also probably a
result of data problems: the early work on the competition-performance relationship used industry-
level information and the later work using firm-level data has tended to examine small samples
consisting only of surviving firms in relatively stable market economies.  Both the empirical setting
we investigate – a massive competitive shock on a population of highly inefficient firms – and the
comprehensiveness of our data suggest that this issue may be fruitfully addressed.  Indeed, the
possibility of non-random survival of firms implies that we should take selection bias into account in
our estimation procedure.
Finally, competitive forces may be correlated with other variables, which are both necessary to
control for and of particular interest in and of themselves.  Most obviously, it is possible that industries
with less concentrated market structure were more likely to be privatized, as the state withheld natural
monopolies and resource sectors from the privatization program.  Thus, it would be desirable to
analyze patterns of ownership and corporate governance, which have undergone huge changes in
Russia during this period (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995; Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse, 1997;
Earle and Estrin, 1997).  The data we employ in this paper unfortunately lack very precise measures of
these changes, but we are able to distinguish some basic categories of state and private firms, and we
control for these variables when examining the impact of our measures of competition.  Related to the
issue of state ownership is the hardness of the firm’s budget constraints, as a variety of types of direct
and indirect support for firms continued in Russia through the 1990s (Earle and Estrin, 1998).
Softness of the budget constraint, which may also be correlated with market structure, is difficult to
measure, unfortunately, but we attempt to control for it using some proxy variables here.8
3.  Econometric Framework
In estimating the impact of the various dimensions of the competition-efficiency relationship,
our method in this paper follows the recent literature on natural and quasi-experiments in economics
(Meyer, 1995).  We argue that the socialist policies created a different data-generating process for
variables representing competititive pressure at the time of liberalization, thus creating some
exogenous variation in these factors and alleviating the possible simultaneity bias that besets analyses
of market structure in the standard setting of stable market economies.  According to the "efficient
market structure" view of Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977), for instance, market concentration
arises as a result of the growth of more efficient firms, implying that concentration measures may be
endogenous when included as regressors in profitability or productivity equations.
Under the Soviet regime, however, central planners determined the size and resources of firms
according to the whims of the Communist Party leadership and political criteria such as regional
integration, employment, and military considerations (Kornai, 1992).  Planners had an incentive also
to take efficiency into account (simply to increase their rents), but they faced extraordinary difficulties
in measuring firm productivity in an economy of fixed, distorted relative prices and considerable black
market activity.  Managerial incentives were tied primarily to fulfillment of the output plan targets,
and only secondarily to costs (which again were measured using artificial prices).  For these reasons,
we believe that the process of reverse causality – running from efficiency to market structure – is
much attenuated when we study firms and industries emerging from the socialist system.  We do
control for other confounding influences and various sources of heterogeneity, however, and we take
into account sample selection bias working through the survival process.
Concerning the indicator of enterprise performance, the traditional industrial organization
literature going back to Bain (1956) has focused on profitability or price-cost margins in relation to
measures of competitive pressure (market structure), but our interest in this paper is technical
efficiency rather than pricing behavior.  The corporate governance literature in the West has been
more concerned with efficiency issues and has adopted a number of alternative measures: accounting
profits (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Prowse, 1992), abnormal stock
price increases (e.g., Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1996), and Tobin’s Q (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988;
McConnell and Servaes, 1990).  The literature on private versus state ownership has tended to use
accounting measures of profits and revenues, due to the unavailability of stock prices for state-owned
firms (e.g., Boardman and Vining, 1989; Megginson, Nash, and Randenbourgh, 1994).  Finally,
Bhagat and Black (1997) have recently included a variety of firm-value and accounting measures,
concluding that some results are non-robust across the alternative performance variables, although the
focus of their paper is not the effects of market competition, but rather of board composition.
In the context of the Russian transition, however, such performance indicators are highly
questionable, due to problems of both measurability and appropriateness.  No reliable measures of
firm value are available, as stock markets are just beginning to operate and there are few benchmarks
for evaluating the potential of firms.  Accounting profits (and price-cost margins) are notoriously
unreliable, and furthermore they may reflect market power and monopolistic price-setting as well as
efficiency considerations.
Instead, we follow the approach of Nickell (1996) and others (including empirical analyses of
the comparative performance of producer cooperatives versus conventional firms – see the summary
in Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993), of focusing on disembodied total factor productivity (TFP).
We estimate the evolution of the impact of competition on TFP over several years of post-
liberalization data, controlling for other factors and for selection bias.  Our data permit us to estimate
an augmented production function with three inputs:
Y = F(A, K, L1, L2), (1)
where Y=value-added, K=capital stock, L1=labor services of type 1 (number of production workers),
L2=labor services of type 2 (number of nonproduction workers), and A indexes total factor
productivity (disembodied), with
A=A(X, u), (2)
where X is a vector of factors affecting managerial and worker incentives in the firm, including those
arising from market structure, and u is a disturbance reflecting residual factors affecting productivity.
Assuming a translog form for F and an exponential for A, (1) can be rewritten as9
logYi = γ 0'Xi + γ KlogKi + γ 1logL1i + γ 2logL2i
+ γ KK (logKi)
2 + γ 11(logL1i)
2 + γ 22(logL2i)
2
+ γ K1logKilogL1i + γ K2logKilogL2i + γ 12logL1ilogL2i + ui,( 3 )
where log refers to the natural logarithm, i indexes firms and the γ  are parameters to be estimated,
including the vector γ 0 of coefficients on the elements in Xi.  Our measures of Xi include national and
regional product market competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman index or 2-firm concentration ratio),
mixtures of the national and regional measures (with weights given alternatively by the percent of
consumer goods in total firm output and by a measure of transportation infrastructure), import
penetration, local labor market competition (the HHI for employment in the firm's municipality or
rayon), and a measure of transportation infrastructure quality (under the assumption that better
transportation infrastructure quality may facilitate product and factor market competition).
Several econometric problems arise in this estimation.  One is the possibility that  E(Xiui)≠ 0
due to the endogeneity problems discussed above.  In the standard market economy setting,
instrumenting Xi with lagged values may not adequately address this problem, as there may well be
serial correlation in the data-generating process, for instance due to expectations about future market
structure.  Our argument is that the shock of price and entry liberalization was almost completely
unexpected, in the sense that most prior decisions affecting Xi92, the value of Xi in the year of the
shock, 1992, were made without any anticipation that the shock would occur.  Furthermore,
liberalization can be interpreted as a structural change in γ 0, the impact of Xi on productivity.  While
before liberalization, central planning and monitoring determined the level of productive efficiency,
afterwards firms were supposed to compete on the market and to make their own decisions with
respect to their output prices, their quantities of production, and their employment of factors of
production.  Thus, the effect of Xi may increase over time.
We implement these ideas using two different methods, which we label the "quasi-
experimental" and the "instrumental variables" approach, respectively.  Both rely on the use of panel
information beginning at the date of liberalization, when we argue that market structure was relatively
exogenous.  According to the first approach, we fix Xit = Xi92 for all t > 92, where t indexes years (in
our data through 1998), and estimate
logYit = γ 0'Xi92 + γ KlogKit + γ 1logL1it + γ 2logL2it
+ γ KK (logKit)
2 + γ 11(logL1it)
2 + γ 22(logL2it)
2
+ γ K1logKitlogL1it + γ K2logKitlogL2it + γ 12logL1itlogL2it+ uit.( 4 )
Under our assumption that Xi92 is exogenously determined, E(Xi92uit)=0, and estimation of (4) yields
consistent estimates of γ 0.  As a further check on the robustness of the procedure, we add random
effects, permitting individual firm heterogeneity (in the intercept) to vary according to a normal
distribution.
5  To estimate the evolution of the productivity response to the liberalization shock, we
also permit γ 0 to vary across years:
logYit = γ 03'D93Xi92 + γ 04'D94Xi92 + γ 05'D95Xi92 + γ 06'D96Xi92 + γ 07 'D97Xi92 + γ 08'D98Xi92
+ γ KlogKit + γ 1logL1it + γ 2logL2it
+ ½γ KK (logKit)
2 + ½γ 11(logL1it)
2 + ½γ 22(logL2it)
2
+ γ K1logKitlogL1it + γ K2logKitlogL2it + γ 12logL1itlogL2it+ uit, (4')
where Dt=1 if the year=t, and 0 otherwise.  From the estimates for γ 03 to γ 08, we can trace out the
influence of the suddenly exposed competitive climate on enterprise behavior.  Following Meyer
(1995), we call (4) and (4') the "quasi-experimental" approach because we are treating the 1992 values
of the competition variables as though they are exogenous due to their determination by central
planners under state socialism.
Our second, "instrumental variables" approach permits Xi to vary over time, and is thus more
conventional:
logYit = γ 0'Xit + γ KlogKit + γ 1logL1it + γ 2logL2it
+ γ KK (logKit)
2 + γ 11(logL1it)
2 + γ 22(logL2it)
2
+ γ K1logKitlogL1it + γ K2logKitlogL2it + γ 12logL1itlogL2it+ uit.( 5 )
                                                          
5 We do not employ fixed effects, both because of the low intertemporal variation in our variables of interest (as
we show below) and because of the many unobservable changes in firm boundaries associated with spin-offs,
split-ups, and mergers during the transition process.10
The problem here is the standard one that Xit is endogenous so that E(Xituit)≠ 0, thus we must take into
account the possible endogenous evolution of market structure in a different way.  Our method is to
treat Xi92 as a valid instrument:  correlated with Xit but not uit.  Random effects are again added to one
specification as a robustness check.  We can also investigate whether γ 0 varies across years, as firms
gradually become more sensitive to competitive forces after the initial shock by permitting it to vary:
logYit = γ 03'D93Xit + γ 04'D94Xit + γ 05'D95Xit + γ 06'D96Xit + γ 07 'D97Xit + γ 08'D98Xit
+ γ KlogKit + γ 1logL1it + γ 2logL2it
+ γ KK (logKit)
2 + γ 11(logL1it)
2 + γ 22(logL2it)
2
+ γ K1logKitlogL1it + γ K2logKitlogL2it + γ 12logL1itlogL2it+ uit, (5')
where again we use IV estimation, treating Xi92 as exogenous.
Another problem in estimating any of these equations is that the sample may be nonrandom
due to systematic patterns of exit and survival: again if these are correlated with both Xi and Yi, then
this may produce bias in the estimates.  As discussed above, such selection effects may be especially
powerful when the competitive shock is very large. If the failure rate of firms is correlated with
performance and the size of the shock, which seems to be a probable situation, then this may imply
E(uit)  ≠  0 and induce a bias in the estimate of β t. To address this issue, we estimate a survival
probability function
Pr(Sit+1 = 1)  = 1 - Φ  (δ 1'Xi92 + δ 2'Zit + δ 3Subsidiary93i + δ 4Plants93i), (6)
where Φ  is the normal distribution function, Zit refers to observable characteristics of firms influencing
competition and productivity (discussed further below),  and the δ  are parameters to be estimated,
including vectors of coefficients associated with Xi92 and Zit.  Subsidiary93i indicates whether the firm
is in a subsidiary relationship in 1993 and Plants93i indicates the number of plants in 1993, additional
variables that are included in the survival equation but not the performance equation.
There may also be other variables affecting TFP.  In the Russian context, ownership is a
natural candidate, insofar as the state was the dominant owner for decades while the privatization
program produced a quite heterogeneous ownership and corporate governance structure by 1994.  If
this heterogeneity is correlated with market structure (for instance, because more competitive sectors
were more likely to be privatized), then estimates of γ 0 will be biased.  Of course, ownership may
suffer from endogeneity problems as well; because our ownership measures consist of a set of dummy
variables by ownership type, in one set of specifications, we take the possible endogeneity into
account using a selection bias correction.
Other factors affecting TFP, as discussed in Section 2 above, include initial conditions and the
magnitude of the demand shock faced by the firm, as the state cut its orders drastically and customer
and supply chains broke down (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997).  A firm with better initial conditions
may have been more cushioned from the impact of competition, while a greater shock suggests that
firms may have greater difficulty adjusting and maintaining TFP.  Our controls for initial conditions
include affiliation in the Military-Industrial Complex, the share of exports in its total output in 1993,
and its profitability in 1992.
We also include the change in real industry and regional output and in industry producer price
indices under the assumption that these represent exogenous factors that may be correlated with
unobserved shocks to a firm’s productivity and possibly with competition and ownership as well.  We
hypothesize that firms facing a greater demand shock will have more difficulty maintaining productive
efficiency, due to the costs of laying off workers, unbundling equipment and other capital, etc.  A
greater price change, though, should give firms more of a cushion, allowing them to delay
restructuring.  As discussed in Section 2, the effects of these variables may also reflect market
conditions in a firm's environment:   particularly for declining firms, maintaining TFP may be easier
when the industry and region is growing, facilitating the release of workers and capital to other firms.
We also include industry group dummies (9 groups) and the percentage of firm output reported as
"consumer goods."  These controls may also help to take into account problems in the measurement of
the capital stock, for instance due to some firms inheriting relatively modern equipment, since such
variation is likely to be correlated with initial conditions and industry affiliation.
In addition, there may be aggregate fluctuations over time; certainly such time effects would
appear to be important in Russia.  Finally, the factors of production may themselves be endogenous;11
we instrument them using their 1992 values.  To summarize, assuming all of these considerations enter
the error term in linear form, they can be summarized as
uit = α i + α t + eit + β 'Zit + xit + fit + vit,( 7 )
where α i is a random firm effect, α t are fixed time (year) effects, eit is the component of the error
associated with sample selection bias due to nonrandom exit and survival, Zit refers to observable
characteristics of firms influencing competition and productivity (such as ownership, initial
conditions, the magnitude of the shock, and other conditions in the firm's market environment) and β
is the associated vector of parameters, xit is the component of the error arising due to endogeneity of
the elements of the competition vector Xit (in specifications (5) and (5')),  fit is the component due to
endogeneity of the factors of production, and vit is a mean-zero error with E(Xitvit)=0.
4.  Data
The firm panel data in this study are constructed from three sets of sources.  The most
important set consists of the Goskomstat (State Committee for Statistics) Industrial Registry:  annual
industrial censuses on all Russian industrial enterprises with 100 or more employees and those with
fewer than 100 employees that are at least 25 percent owned by other legal entities (including the state
or governmental bodies). The data do not cover industrial enterprises with fewer than 100 employees
and more than 75 percent owned by individuals or industrial divisions of non-industrial enterprises
(representing 9.5 percent of industrial employment in 1992).  Similarly to industrial surveys and
censuses in the US, only a small number of variables are collected, but they are sufficient to permit us
to measure market structure quite precisely along a number of dimensions (as described below) and to
estimate three-factor production functions.  We have obtained files for these registries for each of the
years from 1993 to 1998, but as each file contains previous year information for most of the variables,
we are able to make use of the year 1992 data as well, although we do not observe enterprises that
exited between 1992 and 1993.
We supplement the Goskomstat Industrial Registry database with information from two other
sources.   First, a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) database, an annual registry with all foreign-owned
firms and joint ventures in Russia permits us to add a substantial number of firms with foreign
ownership in all years except 1996, when the Industrial Registry contains nearly all of the foreign-
owned firms, and 1998, when the FDI database is not yet available.  Second, we added some
additional enterprises and filled in missing values for enterprises already in the database from a panel
database constructed by Economics, Analysis, and Marketing, Inc. (EKAM) of Moscow using a
second version of the Goskomstat annual industrial censuses.
We constructed a panel by matching enterprise identification codes (OKPOs) across the
supplemented registry files.  Each registry contains 3,000-4,000 OKPOs not in previous registries, and
a similar number of OKPOs drop out of each subsequent registry.  Some of this is due to genuine firm
entry and exit, some due to non-reporting enterprises, and some to enterprises that re-registered,
receiving different OKPOs.  For all the OKPOs not having data in every registry, we searched in all
the other registries for matching enterprises by using names, addresses, industries, employment, and
output values.  By so doing, we were able to link 1,094 enterprises in 1993 whose OKPOs appear to
have changed in a later year, 708 in 1994, 606 in 1995, 203 in 1996, and 78 in 1997.  Since the
registries contain previous year as well as current year values, we were able to fill in entire years of
data for several thousand enterprises that existed in a particular year, but for some reason did not
report.
The definition of the unit of observation is an important issue in our treatment of the data.  To
start with, we should emphasize that our data pertain to firms, as is most appropriate for measuring
market structure, rather than establishments.  The definition of the firm deserves further comment,
however.  In the process of linking enterprises across years, we identified several hundred cases where
both consolidated data and data for subsidiaries appeared.  In such cases, the name of the parent
enterprise and the word "subsidiary" usually appeared somewhere in the field for the name of the
subsidiary, and employment of the subsidiaries usually added exactly to the employment of the
consolidated record.  We avoid double-counting by excluding either consolidated entities or
subsidiaries, but choose between these based on the purpose at hand:  we define the unit of observation
to be the consolidated entity when we measure product market concentration at the national level, but12
use the information on subsidiaries instead in measuring product market concentration within regions
and labor market concentration within cities, and when estimating our productivity equations.
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The top half of Table 1 shows the construction of the sample used to compute our competition
measures.  The first three rows contain the number of observations obtained from the three sources,
and the fourth shows the total number.  The sample sizes for computation of the national and regional
product market and labor market concentration measures are shown in the following three rows,
respectively labeled "Total (minus subsidiaries) with non-missing output and industry;" "Total
(including subsidiaries, minus all consolidated) with non-missing region, output, and industry;" and
"Total (including subsidiaries, minus all consolidated) with non-missing employment and city."
The bottom part of Table 1 shows the construction of the sample for the regression analysis.
As discussed above, here we include subsidiaries wherever possible and exclude redundant
consolidated firms (that is, firms for which we are able to include subsidiaries); the total is shown in
the first row of this part.  From this total in each year, we excluded firms classified as public
organizations (non-profit firms and those belonging to the ministry of culture, the environment, health,
or the interior – the database contains a number of prisons).  We have also excluded enterprises that
have fewer than 100 employees in any year, because the database includes only firms in this category
with at least 25 percent ownership by a legal entity, which skews the sample.  Finally, missing data are
a significant problem in the database, creating a final restriction on firms included in our sample for
regression analysis.  The most important restriction stems from the fact that our research question
concerns the impact of the competitive shock of 1992, thus requires information for that year and
indeed pertains only to firms that existed at that time.  New start-up firms, likely to be intrinsically
different in many respects from the enterprises inherited from the socialist system, are therefore
excluded from our sample, which is in any case necessary since such firms entered only after 1992 or
were very small in 1992, so would not be in the 1993 registry.
The regression sample thus restricted contains 1992 to 1998 data for an unbalanced panel of
14,961 industrial enterprises (39 firms provide 1992 information but are missing output in 1993,
explaining the apparent discrepancy with the 1993 figure in the bottom row of Table 1).  This sample
covers 75 percent of total industrial employment in 1993, as reported by Goskomstat.
Next, we turn to a discussion of our measures of competitive pressure, shown in Table 2
(variable mnemonics are defined in the appendix).  Concerning product market structure, our data
permit us to calculate conventional measures, including the national Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) or any concentration ratio or dispersion index, since the database contains the population of
large firms.  We calculate these measures at the most disaggregated level available: the Russian 5-digit
industry classification (OKONKh), of which there are 318 separate categories in the database.  As
discussed in Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova (1994) and Brown and Brown (1999), the 5-digit
OKONKh is roughly comparable to 4-digit categories in the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification,
although some sectors are less and others somewhat more disaggregated.
Table 2 shows the national output HHI and CR2 (2-firm concentration ratio) for the years
1992 through 1998.  Note that for convenience of comparison across a variety of measures, we have
defined the competition measures as 1-HHI and 1-CR2, respectively.  It is notable that the data so
measured show a slight decrease in competition over this period, consistent with the findings of Brown
and Brown (1999).  The table also shows the mean number of firms by 5-digit industry and the
corresponding Gini coefficient, an alternative measure of dispersion; the rise in the Gini implies more
inequality in output across firms within a 5-digit industry.
As we have argued in Section 2 above, the appropriate definition of the market in Russia may
be more geographically constrained than the national concentration measures indicate.  Therefore, we
also calculate regional concentration measures at the level of subject of the Russia Federation (oblast,
of which there are 77 in the database).
7  The mean values by year of 1-RegHHI and 1-RegCR2 are
                                                          
6 We also conduct one test of the importance of Soviet-era "production associations," where all firms in the same
industry are so grouped when we measure product market concentration, as described further below.
7 There are 89 subjects of the Russian Federation. The database does not include data from Chechnya or
Ingushetia, and the ten autonomous districts (okrugi) are aggregated together with the regions that surround
them.13
displayed in Table 2, showing less competition within regions than nationally, and again showing a
slight decline in measured competitive pressure over the years of the sample.
But the appropriate definition – whether regional, national, or some combination of the two –
likely varies across industries, and so we have also constructed mixture variables, which are linear
combinations of the regional and national measures with firm-level weights given by variables that
may be associated with the geographic scope of the market.  One weighting variable is the proportion
of consumer goods (final goods) in a firm's output, ConShare if consumer goods are more likely to
compete within a region, while producer goods compete nationally, then the regional concentration
measure is more appropriate the greater the share of consumer goods.  1-MixedHHI and 1-MixedCR2
in Table 2 are the resulting mixture variables.  An alternative weight, which varies across regions, is a
measure of transportation infrastructure quality; regions with better transportation infrastructure are
more likely to participate in the national market than those with poorer transportation, as explained
below.
Similar measures for market share defined nationally, regionally, and mixed are also shown in
Table 2.  Again, the data show a rise, on average, in the market share of firms in the sample.
We also consider the international dimension of competition, particularly important in an
economy that had been protected for decades and where new start-ups could only very gradually begin
to compete with the incumbent enterprises.  Our measure of import penetration is defined
conventionally as the ratio of the value of imports to the value of domestic consumption (calculated as
output – exports + imports) in a five-digit sector.  We computed this using the USD value of Russian
imports and exports, obtained from the Russian Customs Committee on traded goods classified by the
United Nations harmonized product codes (6-digit HS codes).  These codes were assigned to ISIC3
(international standard industrial classification revision 3) industry codes, using a very detailed
description of the ISIC3 codes, and then converted to OKONKhs, using Goskomstat's conversion from
OKONKh to ISIC3.  Unfortunately the conversion is not always one-to-one; when there were multiple
OKONKhs, then firms are matched into ISIC3 categories according to detailed information on their
products in the registry, and when there were multiple ISIC3 categories per OKONKh, then the former
were distributed over the latter proportionately.  Monthly exchange rates and monthly domestic output
data were used to calculate the yearly weighted average exchange rate by OKONKh and convert
domestic output from RUB to USD.
Combining the information on imports, exports, and domestic output (from the database)
enabled us to compute import penetration ratios, Imports shown in Table 2.  Imports increased sharply
from 1992 to 1996, but the trade information is available only through 1996, unfortunately; in our
regressions, we assume that import penetration was constant thereafter.
The final measure of competition shown in Table 2 concerns the labor market.  We have
coded 3,756 localities ("cities") consisting of the urban or rural district where firms in the regression
sample are located.  For each of these we have calculated the HHI for industrial employment as a
measure of local labor market concentration.  Subtracting from 1 to turn this into a measure of
competition, we have the variable LaborComp in Table 2, which shows a slight decline over the 1992-
98 period.
It is a well-documented empirical regularity that concentration ratios tend to be quite similar
across countries.  Pryor (1972), for instance, estimated regressions of the concentration measures for a
set of industries in one country on the like measure of the same industries in the United States, finding
coefficients close to one, and with high R
2s.  It is thus particularly striking that the correlation between
product market concentration indices in Russia and the U.S. has been found to be rather small
(Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova, 1994; Brown and Brown, 1999); in the latter study, the R
2 is
close to zero.  Table 3 shows how concentration measures have evolved in Russia since the 1992
liberalization shock, using a similar method to Pryor's, but here we regress the set of indices for one
year on the set for 1992.  Product and labor market concentration appear to have evolved only slowly,
with some tendency for a flattening of the relationship: more concentrated sectors and local labor
markets have had a greater tendency than less concentrated ones to become less concentrated.  With
respect to Imports, however, the relationship is weak: apparently, Imports are quite volatile across
sectors.  While domestic market structure evolves only slowly (as shown by the high R
2s of the
estimated equations, Imports may be quite responsive to changing conditions.14
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the variables we employ in the analysis (with
mnemonics again defined in the appendix) for the sample used in the regressions.  To proxy for Yi, we
use output, as value-added is unavailable, and we deflate by the 5-digit level producer price index.  L1t
is production worker labor and L2t is non-production labor, while Kt represents the firm's productive
capital stock:  plant and equipment used in production.  Although capital stock measures were
notoriously unreliable due to arbitrary pricing during the Soviet period, most investment from that
period has already depreciated away, and recent investment has taken place at market prices, so that
the figures increasingly represent standard historical cost accounting.  Our data also helps to resolve a
particular difficulty, which concerns the occasional year-end revaluation of the capital stock due to
inflation.  The data contain capital stock figures for the beginning and end of year, as well as the
average over the course of the year.  We use the average figure in our estimations below, but we are
able to detect revaluations by comparing the end of one year figure with the beginning of year figure
for the next year.  In this way, we were able to build up consistent series for the capital stock for most
firms in the sample.
In addition to output, the three factors of production, and the competition measures discussed
above, we include two more variables in Table 4, both from year 1992.  The first, 1-PAMixedHHI,
redefines firms according to their membership in production associations during the Soviet period,
which were more or less tightly knit groups of firms frequently in supply relationships with one
another. Using the assumption here that former members of the same production association do not
compete with one another, we classify firms operating in the same industry and within such an
association as single entities for the purpose of computing the 1992 product market HHI.  The second,
Transport, is an index of the transport infrastructure in the region (subject of the Russian Federation)
in which the firm is located.   We have constructed this variable based on Institute for Advanced
Studies (1998), but have reversed the variable (dividing by 10 and then subtracting from 1), such that
the larger the number, the better the region’s transport infrastructure relative to other regions. The
index is based on the proximity of the region to a non-freezing port, proximity to a main transportation
junction, the average distance between settlements, the number of road accidents per 100,000
population in 1996, the number of big airports in 1996, the airport capacity in 1995, the railway
density in 1996, the density of railways in common use in 1996, the share of railways with electric
power supply measured by length, car road density in 1996, inner water-ways density in 1996, and the
number of large sea ports in 1996.
Descriptive statistics for other regressors can also be found in Table 4.  Ownership is
measured as a categorical variable by type, based on the measures supplied by Goskomstat. State
ownership is disaggregated into FedGov, RegGov, and MuniGov categories, which is useful to test
hypotheses about the degree to which different levels of government may tend to interfere in
enterprise behavior in order to accomplish political objectives.  The Goskomstat defines these
categories as 100 percent ownership by each level of government, respectively. Firms of "MixedOwn"
ownership have both state and private owners, but unfortunately there is no information on the relative
importance of each.  The MixedOwn group probably contains most privatized firms, as it includes 43
percent of the sample and Earle and Estrin (1997) have shown that the state retained some
shareholdings in most such firms in mid-1994, while it is clear that subsequent privatization has
proceeded quite slowly.  But the "Private" category is also large (39.1 percent of the sample), and our
sample selection rules should exclude nearly all new start-ups, so these firms are likely to have been
privatized as well.  Foreign is distinguished from domestic private ownership, although the former
category accounts for only a tiny proportion of the sample (.8 percent).  Unfortunately, there is
otherwise no information on types of private owners, whether insiders or outsiders, and none
whatsoever on the concentration of ownership.
Table 4 also shows our measures of firm initial conditions of potential viability affecting
restructuring and the magnitude of demand shocks: Military, a dummy variable for firms in the
military-industrial complex (a formal subordination to one of the Russian military ministries),
ExpShare93 (share of exports in output), Profit92 (per output) in 1992, IndGrowtht (growth in five-
digit industry output), RegGrowtht (growth in regional output), and PriceCht (the log ratio of the
Goskomstat price deflator for the year to the previous year prices for the five-digit industry) as a
measure of relative price change.   Other variables, not shown, include the percentage of consumer15
goods in total output, ConShare; and eight industry group dummies (the other industries group is the
omitted category in regression analysis).
Finally, the table shows the additional variables used in our survival regression:  Survival, a
dummy equal to one in each year the firm remains in the database; Plants93, the number of plants in
the firms in 1993; and Subsidiary93, a dummy for being in a subsidiary relationship (as either parent
or daughter) in 1993.  The latter two variables constitute our exclusion restrictions: they enter the
survival regression, but not the productivity equation.
5.  Results
We begin by reporting the results from estimating the survival probability regression, equation
(6), then move on to the results from estimating equations (4) and (5) with the error component
structure specified in equation (7), followed by a consideration of the dynamics of response to the
competitive shock as in equations (4') and (5'), of alternative specifications of the competition
measures, and of the results for ownership.
To take into account selection bias due to enterprise exit from the sample, we employ control
function methods (Heckman, 1979).  Exit may occur because of shutdown, re-organization (split-up or
merger), or dropping out of the sample for other reasons; unfortunately we cannot distinguish the
"true" deaths of firms from the re-organizations and non-reporting incidents.  If they are non-random,
even the latter may cause selection bias, however, and thus we must include them.  We first run a
probit regression using all industrial enterprises in 1992 with non-missing values, where the dependent
variable is a dummy for whether the enterprise was still in the database in each subsequent year
(reporting non-missing values for output, the two types of labor, and capital), as in equation (6) above.
In addition to the determinants of total factor productivity, we include two variables in the
survival regression which are excluded from the TFP regressions.  The first is a dummy representing
whether the enterprise was in a parent-subsidiary relationship in 1993, Subsidiary, because such
enterprises were more likely to undergo reorganizations leading to shutdowns of part of the
consolidated entity.  Holding companies and conglomerate enterprises were often reorganized during
privatization; in some cases the divisions became independent and the holding company disappeared,
while in others the holding was consolidated and the divisions stopped reporting independently.  The
second variable is the natural logarithm of the number of plants the firm had in 1993, Plants, included
for similar reasons as Subsidiary. We have no reason to believe that either subsidiary relationships or
number of plants should affect the total factor productivity of firms, however, motivating our
exclusion of the variables from the TFP regressions.  We use the inverse Mills’ ratio from this probit
(SurvMills) in all the second stage regressions in the paper.
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Table 5 reports the results from estimation of equation (6), the survival regression.  The 1-
MixedHHI92 product market competition variable enters negatively, as does the Imports92 variable,
suggesting that the liberalization shock may have driven some firms out of business.  LaborComp is
estimated to have a negative effect, although it is too imprecisely estimated to be statistically
significant, but Transport is estimated to have a strongly negative and significant effect, suggesting
that firms in regions with good transportation infrastructure are more exposed to competitive pressure.
Compared to firms owned by the Russian Federation, all other ownership types are more likely to
survive except for Private and Foreign, which has the lowest survival probability.  The results for the
initial conditions and demand shock variables are consistent with our hypotheses: Military is estimated
to negatively affect survival, while ExpShare93, size, profitability, industry and regional growth, and
price change enter positively. Finally, Plants has a positive and Subsidiary has a negative impact,
confirming our interpretation of the possible roles of these variables in determining the survival
probability.
While the survival issue may deserve further research, for present purposes we are most
interested in calculating the inverse Mills’ ratio (SurvMills) for inclusion in our TFP equations, basic
results for which are shown in Table 6.  The first two columns contain the estimate of equation (4), the
"quasi-experimental model" with market structure measured as fixed in 1992, the second differing
from the first by the addition of random effects to the model.  The third and fourth columns contain
estimates of equation (5), where market structure varies across time, but is instrumented with its 1992
                                                          
8 In fact, there is little difference in the results when we ignore the potential bias.16
value; again, the final column adds random effects to the model.  All the models appear to fit the data
well, with R
2 of about 0.58, and the implied marginal products are positive and of plausible orders of
magnitude for the three factors.  The coefficient on SurvMills is negative, but its inclusion does not
affect the qualitative findings.
The competition indicators in the specifications shown in Table 6 include our preferred
"mixed" measure – 1-MixedHHI, combining 1-NatHHI and 1-RegHHI – as well as Imports,
LaborComp, and Transport.  All four competition variables are estimated to have positive effects on
TFP in all four specifications.  The magnitudes differ little when random effects are added to the
model, but are larger in equation (5) estimates for product market competition measures, especially for
import penetration.  The increase in magnitudes for these dimensions of competition is likely due to
their more rapid evolution compared with labor market competition, as was clear from the analysis in
Table 3 above.  The time pattern of the impact of these variables is discussed further below.  The
positive impact of Transport may be reflecting the cushion from competition in more remote regions,
as well as the greater costs for firms in such regions to obtain inputs and sell their goods outside their
region.
Concerning ownership, the specifications in Table 6 contain a disaggregation into six
categories, with FedGov omitted.  Overall, they suggest that private (non-state) firms – the bottom
three categories – outperform state firms.  Inclusion of the random effects reduces the differential of
the MixedOwn, Private, and MuniGov categories, relative to FedGov.  Later in this section, we discuss
the ownership results in more detail and provide estimates where we account for potential selection
bias through an endogenous treatment of ownership.
Concerning other independent variables, the Table 6 results concerning initial conditions are
quite consistent across models, and they are largely consistent with our motivations for including
them: positive initial conditions, associated with Profit92 are estimated to raise TFP, while affiliation
with the Military-Industrial Complex reduces it.  Somewhat surprisingly, the share of exports in total
output is estimated to reduce TFP, though when we replace ExpShare93 with a simple dummy for
ExpShare93>0 (not reported here), we obtain a positive coefficient that is significant at one percent.
The statistically significant estimated coefficients on the demand shock indicators IndGrowtht,
RegGrowtht, and PriceCht are consistent with both conjectures we have offered:  On the one hand,
these variables may be reflecting idiosyncratic shocks to the firm, suggesting downsizing firms may
have greater difficulties in maintaining productivity.  On the other hand, they may also be reflecting
factor supply effects in the market environment, making it easier for contracting firms to release
factors and maintain productivity.  PriceCht is estimated to reduce TFP, consistent with a budget-
softening effect for firms in industries with positive price shocks.  The magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients fall when individual firm random effects are added to the models, but only RegGrowtht
becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  Controlling for the other variables, TFP
shows a declining trend over the sample period.
We present the results from estimating equations (4) and (5) with alternative specifications of
the competition measures and alternative estimation techniques below, but first we turn to estimation
of equations (4') and (5'), where we permit the effect of the competition measures to vary across years.
The results, which appear in Table 7, show that the time-invariant estimates of the base specifications
mask some trends in the impact of competition.  With respect to our preferred measure of competitive
pressure in the product market, 1-MixedHHI, the impact in specification (4’) is estimated to be
negative in 1993 and 1994, although not statistically significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient
grows steadily, reaching what appears to be a long-run impact of about 25 percent only after four
years.  The results for 1-MixedHHI in specification (5’) is similarly trended, although the coefficients
are larger in every year, consistent with the difference in Table 6.  The estimated impacts of the other
three competition measures do not reflect strong trends, in the case of Imports and LaborComp
because the coefficients are quite stable across years, while the coefficient on Transport is quite
volatile, if consistently positive and nearly always statistically significant.  The results support the
hypothesis that there may be some lag in the responsiveness of firms to a competitive shock in the
domestic product market, but there is little evidence of such a lag with respect to the other dimensions
of competition.
Next, we turn to the question whether the effects of competition are non-linear.  Table 8 shows
simple quadratic specifications of the competition variables, where the rest of the specification is the17
same as in Table 6, Columns 1 and 3 (Equations (4) and (5) without random effects).  Domestic
product market competition appears to have a convex effect on TFP, with an implied negative slope at
low levels in specification (4), but still strongly positive in the relevant range (the mean 1-MixedHHI
from Table 4 is .81).  The impact of import penetration is estimated to be strongly concave, however,
in specification (4) actually turning negative after a penetration rate of about 35 percent.  This is
consistent with the view that "too much" or "too tough" competition may actually discourage firms
from attempting to improve their performance.  With respect to labor market competition, the results
again imply a convex relationship, one that is also positive over the relevant range.  The convexity
suggests that this variable matters most in differentiating very dynamic and competitive labor markets
from the majority of stagnant, uncompetitive ones in Russia.  With respect to Transport, the results
imply an initial decline followed by a rise in the estimated effect, with a positive effect from a level of
about 0.4 onwards.  Somewhat paradoxically, the marginal impact of Transport is estimated to be
negative at its mean value (.3) in Russia.
We investigate the effects of alternative measures of market structure on total factor
productivity growth, since some previous studies have found different results from different measures
9
and theory does not clearly point to one measure being superior to another.  Robustness is therefore an
important issue.  Panel A of Table 9 shows the results from running the regressions in the first and
third columns of Table 6 with alternative measures of market structure.  With the exception of 1-
NatHHI and 1-PAMixedHHI, where we use production associations rather than firms in defining the
competition measure, all specifications of competitive pressure provide strong evidence that domestic
competition has a disciplining effect on enterprises.  The statistically insignificant findings with
respect to these exceptions probably reflect the inappropriateness of assuming that competition takes
place only at the national level in Russia and that production associations represent significant
collusion for the exercise of market power, respectively.  The negative coefficient on 1-PAMixedHHI
suggests that the former members of these associations, which include firms in the same industry, are
actually competing with one another, contrary to popular claims in Russia.  When we include both 1-
NatHHI and 1-RegHHI in a single specification, the results strongly suggest that 1-RegHHI is the
better measure of competitive pressure, further buttressing our contention of the importance of
geography in understanding Russian industrial organization.  A similar finding does not appear for
market share, however, where all three measures – national, regional, and mixed – produce positive
and statistically significant results (even when both national and regional are both included as
regressors in the same specification).
We also investigate robustness with respect to estimation technique and specification of the
production function.  Panel B of Table 9 shows the results when we use the least-absolute-deviations
method, which estimates the conditional median rather than the conditional mean as a function of the
regressors and is therefore robust with respect to outliers, while Panel C shows the results when we
interact all the factors of production (including higher-order terms) with nine industry dummies to
permit heterogeneity in the production function.  The results demonstrate that not only the qualitative
conclusions, but also even very similar magnitudes of estimation results, are robust to these changes in
our methodology.
Our results on the geographic dimension of competition motivate us to consider the role of
transportation infrastructure more closely.  Table 10 shows the estimation results where we interact
Transport with the other dimensions of competition and where we use Transport as the mixing
variable (in place of ConShare) in constructing a mixed national-regional competition measure.  In the
top specification, for both Equations (4) and (5), Transport is estimated to enhance domestic product
market competition (1-MixedHHI), suggesting that competitive pressure by this measure is more
effective when the frictions of transportation costs are reduced.  The interaction with import
competition shows inconsistent results across the two specifications, however:  in Equation (4), import
competition is enhanced by Transport, while in Equation (5), it is diminished.  Increases in Transport
are estimated to reduce the impact of labor market competition, suggesting that high municipal labor
market concentration may not give firms as much monopsony power when transportation
infrastructure is better, as workers will be able to commute to jobs in other cities more easily.
Controlling for these interactions, the main Transport effect is estimated to be positive in both
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specifications, although the magnitude and statistical significance is much greater in Equation (5).
The bottom two specifications, which employ Transport as the mixing variable, show results fairly
similar to those we obtained when ConShare was used to mix the national and regional competition
measures.  This demonstrates, from another viewpoint, that it appears to be inappropriate to define
product markets as either national or regional; rather, the geographic scope varies across industries and
is some combination of the two.
Finally, we provide a more detailed analysis of the effects of ownership in Table 11.   Recall
the result in Table 6 that non-state firms are estimated to outperform state-owned ones; in the first
"OLS" specification in Table 10, we reproduce those results, including in the first column an
aggregation of the three types of non-state ownership:  mixed, 100 percent private, and foreign-owned
companies.  To control for the possibility of bias in the privatization process (the allocation of firms to
various ownership categories), for instance that the enterprises with the best (or worst) prospects for
total factor productivity growth were privatized, we again use the Heckman selection procedure.  We
first run a probit regression with the non-state dummy as the dependent variable, using the share of
non-state enterprises in the region and in the branch ministry as additional variables in the probit,
because the privatization process was highly influenced by regional authorities and branch industry
officials (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995).
10   Enterprises in strategic branches (such as the MIC)
required special permission to be privatized or were banned from privatization altogether.  We then
insert the inverse Mills’ ratio from the probit regression (lambda) in the second-stage performance
regression along with the ownership dummy.  We estimate the second stage equations with and
without random effects.
The results of the first-stage probit (not shown) suggest that non-state enterprises tend to have
significantly higher employment, face more product market, labor market, and import competition,
exported less in 1993, have initially higher profitability, are less likely to have been in the MIC, and
are located in areas with poorer transportation infrastructure.  Table 11 shows the second-stage
regression results, including the Mills' ratio from the first stage in the second and fourth specifications.
Non-state ownership is estimated to have a positive effect in all specifications, although the magnitude
of the coefficient is substantially lower in all specifications compared to the OLS.  It is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level except in the 2
nd specification, where it meets only a 10 percent
criterion.
To handle possible selection bias in the multiple-ownership category case, we run a
multinomial logit for the selection procedure, and then include the inverse Mills’ ratios for each
ownership category in the second stage regressions, which are shown in Table 11.  The results are
similar to the uncorrected OLS, except that the coefficient for RegGov becomes statistically significant
and the coefficient for MuniGov doubles.
The final two sets of results in Table 11 add random effects, with and without selection
correction.  These show less consistency across specifications than did the Non-State dummy
coefficient.  Foreign has a consistently large coefficient, as does Private except in the final
specification, although even there it is statistically significant.  MuniGov is large and positive except in
the random effects specification without selection correction, where the coefficient becomes
statistically insignificant.  Perhaps the most sensitive variable is MixedOwn, whose coefficient steadily
falls across the four specification, essentially reaching zero when both random effects and the
selection bias correction techniques are applied.  Clearly, these results for ownership must be treated
cautiously, as the measure available to us in these data is rather crude.
6.  Conclusion
Weaned on models of competitive equilibrium, economists instinctively tend to invoke the
virtues of competition in a wide variety of situations.  But this usually unreflective appeal to
competitive forces has received remarkably little empirical testing and verification, and even when it
has been tested, the evidence has been rather weak.  We speculate that the paucity of empirical support
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used for the branch ministry shares and 23,044 used for the regional shares).  There are 136 branch ministries
and 77 regions (oblasts) in the panel.19
is a result of the difficulty of observing these forces at work in equilibrium, or at least in the rather
stable conditions of most economies in which such studies have been conducted.
In this paper, we have exploited the quasi-experiment offered by the Russian economy in
transition to avoid the endogeneity problems that plague other analyses and to observe the potentially
large efficiency effects that may be present in enterprises inherited from the socialist period.  Our
analysis embraces a variety of dimensions of competitive pressure, including not only domestic market
structure at the national level, but also import competition, regional variation of product markets,
transportation infrastructure, and labor market competition.  We have studied the time path of the
impact of a competitive shock – the abrupt liberalization of prices, entry, imports, and labor mobility –
in January 1992, and examined non-linearities in the effect of each of these competitive forces.  Our
data set permits us to investigate virtually any measure of product market competition that has been
proposed, and our results are strongly robust across alternative specifications.
The results provide strong evidence that domestic product market competition, import
competition, and local labor market competition have strong positive effects on total factor
productivity.  The impact of liberalization appears only gradually in the domestic product market,
taking about four years to attain about 90 percent of the long-run value, but we find no such lags with
respect to import competition or labor market competition.  Better transport infrastructure appears to
turn potential product market competition into actual competition, while at the same time reducing
firms’ monopsony power on the labor market by facilitating worker mobility across municipalities.
We also find that non-state firms outperform state enterprises, even after controlling for selection bias
in the determination of ownership.20
Appendix 1. Definitions of Variables
ConShare is the share of consumer goods (final goods) in the enterprise’s total output in 1993.
Emp92 is the log of the enterprise’s 1992 industrial employment.
ExpShare93 is the enterprise’s share of exports in total production in 1993.
FedGov is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by the federal government.
Foreign is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is foreign owned or is a foreign-domestic joint venture .
1-Gini is one minus the Gini coefficient for the five-digit industry using output shares at the national level. A
larger number signifies greater equality of output shares.
Imports is the import penetration ratio:  the share of imports in domestic sales in the five-digit industry.
IndGrowtht is the log of the ratio of year t output of the firm’s five-digit industry (using our database) in
December 1992 prices to the previous year output of the industry in December 1992 prices.
Kt is the book value in 1992 prices of the enterprise’s fixed assets used in industrial production. Revaluations are
controlled for using beginning- and end-year book values.
L1t is the log of the enterprise’s number of production workers.
L2t is the log of the enterprise’s number of non-production employees.
LaborComp is one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the concentration of employment shares of
industrial firms in the enterprise’s municipality (using our database). There are 3,756 municipalities in the panel.
Military is a dummy equal to 1 if the enterprise formerly belonged to an MIC branch ministry.
MixedOwn is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is partially owned by the state and partially by non-state entities.
1-MixedCR2 is (1-RegCR2)*ConShare + (1-NatCR2)*(1-ConShare).
1-MixedHHI is (1-RegHHI)*ConShare + (1-NatHHI)*(1-ConShare).
1-MixedMktSh is (1-RegMktSh)*ConShare + 1-NatMktSh*(1-ConShare).
MuniGov is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by the municipal government.
1-NatCR2 is one minus the national output share of the two largest enterprises ranked by output in the five-digit
Russian industry (OKONKh), of which there are 318 in our panel.
1-NatHHI is one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared output shares of each firm in the
industry) for the five-digit industry at the national level.
1-NatMktSh is the employment share of the enterprise in its five-digit industry at the national level.
Nat  No. Firms is the log of the number of firms in the five-digit industry at the national level in 1992.
Non-State is equal to Private + Foreign + MixedOwn.
PA1-MixedHHI is 1-MixedHHI, except where the regional and national HHI are modified to treat production
associations as if they were single firms. The output of all firms in production association X and in industry Y
was summed prior to calculating the national HHI, and the output of all firms in production association X,
industry Y, and region Z was summed prior to calculating the regional HHI.
Plants93 is the log of the number of plants in 1993.21
PriceCht is the log of the year t average producer price deflator relative to December 1992 for each five-digit
industry. The average producer price deflator was constructed using Goskomstat monthly deflators and volume
of production statistics.
Private is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is 100% owned by private entities.
Profit92 is the enterprise’s profits (losses) divided by output in 1992.
RegGov is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by the regional government.
1-RegCR2 is one minus the regional output share of the two largest enterprises by output in the five-digit
industry in the region in which the enterprise is located. There are 77 regions in the panel.
RegGrowtht is the log of the ratio 199X industrial output of the region in 1990 prices divided by the previous
year output of the region in 1990 prices.  The output numbers were calculated by Goskomstat (not from our
database).
1-RegHHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared output shares of each firm in the industry) for the
five-digit industry at the regional level.
1-RegMktSh is the employment share of the enterprise in its five-digit industry at the regional level.
Subsidiary93 is a dummy equal to 1 if the enterprise was either a subsidiary or parent to a subsidiary in 1993.
SurvMills is the inverse Mills’ ratio from the first-stage probit for whether the enterprise survived or not.
Transport is an index of the region’s transport infrastructure from 0 to 1, such that the larger the number, the
better the region’s transport infrastructure relative to other regions. constructed by the Institute for Advanced
Studies (1998).  We have reversed the variable (subtracting from 1), such that the larger the number, the better
the region’s transport infrastructure relative to other regions. The index is based on the proximity of the region to
a non-freezing port, proximity to a main transportation junction, the average distance between settlements, the
number of road accidents per 100,000 population in 1996, the number of big airports in 1996, the airport
capacity in 1995, the railway density in 1996, the density of railways in common use in 1996, the share of
railways with electric power supply measured by length, car road density in 1996, inner water-ways density in
1996, and the number of large sea ports in 1996.
1-TransportMixedCR2 is (1-RegCR2)*(1-Transport) + (1-NatCR2)*Transport.
1-TransportMixedHHI is (1-RegHHI)*(1-Transport) + (1-NatHHI)*Transport.
Yt is the log of the value of output the enterprise produced in December 1992 prices.22
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Table 1. Construction of the Sample
Number of firms: 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
In the Industrial Registry (minus subsidiaries) 25,541 26,862 28,484 29,674 29,175 26,532
Added from FDI Database 2,448 3,342 3,638 28 2,122 0
Added from EKAM Database 1,144 2,437 37 281 256 0
S
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e
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a
Total (minus subsidiaries) 29,133 32,641 32,159 29,983 31,553 26,532
Total (minus subsidiaries) with non-missing industry and output
(used in national conc.)
25,546 27,212 29,926 28,082 26,522 24,951
Total (incl. subsidiaries, minus all consolidated) with non-missing
region, industry, and output (used in regional conc.)
26,080 27,519 29,964 28,067 26,522 24,951
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Total (incl. subsidiaries, minus all consolidated) with non-missing
employment and city (used in labor concentration)
27,100 28,662 29,851 26,106 25,430 21,350
Total incl. subsidiaries, minus redundant consolidated 30,074 33,156 32,315 30,007 31,553 26,532
Minus firms classified as "Public Organizations" 29,642 32,596 31,661 29,343 30,806 25,675
Minus firms with fewer than 100 employees 19,852 19,993 17,643 15,917 14,910 13,507
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Minus firms with missing values (sample for regression analysis) 14,922 14,120 13,594 12,816 12,117 10,54327
Table 2. Means of Competition Variables
Variables 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1-MixedHHI 0.822
(0.230)
0.822
(0.230)
0.814
(0.232)
0.813
(0.233)
0.802
(0.240)
0.793
(0.245)
0.783
(0.253)
1-MixedCR2 0.635
(0.281)
0.632
(0.281)
0.619
(0.282)
0.615
(0.280)
0.600
(0.282)
0.588
(0.287)
0.575
(0.291)
1-TransportMixedHHI 0.726
(0.249)
0.728
(0.247)
0.725
(0.246)
0.723
(0.244)
0.710
(0.247)
0.700
(0.249)
0.692
(0.252)
1-TransportMixedCR2 0.532
(0.255)
0.530
(0.253)
0.522
(0.246)
0.519
(0.245)
0.503
(0.244)
0.491
(0.244)
0.482
(0.243)
1-NatHHI 0.956
(0.078)
0.952
(0.091)
0.950
(0.096)
0.952
(0.082)
0.944
(0.097)
0.937
(0.103)
0.944
(0.090)
1-NatCR2 0.843
(0.163)
0.833
(0.168)
0.831
(0.174)
0.824
(0.163)
0.805
(0.176)
0.789
(0.188)
0.798
(0.174)
1-RegHHI 0.603
(0.329)
0.609
(0.325)
0.601
(0.321)
0.597
(0.317)
0.578
(0.322)
0.563
(0.325)
0.560
(0.322)
1-RegCR2 0.353
(0.295)
0.356
(0.293)
0.341
(0.282)
0.334
(0.276)
0.317
(0.273)
0.303
(0.270)
0.299
(0.266)
1-Gini 0.396
(0.111)
0.379
(0.106)
0.358
(0.104)
0.333
(0.104)
0.319
(0.106)
0.317
(0.112)
0.308
(0.106)
Nat No. Firms 648
(691)
664
(713)
621
(636)
639
(641)
621
(638)
578
(600)
544
(537)
1-MixedMktSh 0.889
(0.215)
0.893
(0.210)
0.890
(0.211)
0.886
(0.214)
0.878
(0.222)
0.876
(0.223)
0.871
(0.230)
1-NatMktSh 0.986
(0.052)
0.987
(0.051)
0.988
(0.048)
0.989
(0.045)
0.988
(0.045)
0.986
(0.053)
0.987
(0.047)
1-RegMktSh 0.727
(0.346)
0.739
(0.341)
0.743
(0.338)
0.746
(0.339)
0.736
(0.347)
0.725
(0.352)
0.723
(0.349)
Imports 0.075
(0.172)
0.122
(0.170)
0.089
(0.143)
0.239
(0.232)
0.292
(0.730)
LaborComp 0.260
(0.315)
0.262
(0.317)
0.265
(0.320)
0.267
(0.321)
0.253
(0.314)
0.257
(0.315)
0.249
(0.313)
Standard errors are in parentheses.28
Table 3. Change in Market Structure
1-NatHHI 1-NatCR2 1-NatMktSh Imports LaborComp
1993 0.932  (36.85) 0.908  (39.48) 0.911   (49.07)  0.170  (3.04) 0.981   (330.35)
0.876 0.872 0.940 0.018 0.933
1994 0.786  (15.94) 0.837  (24.27) 0.796   (25.81)  0.086  (1.52) 0.938   (195.60)
0.722 0.725 0.761 0.006 0.837
1995 0.736  (13.72) 0.822  (23.87) 0.717   (18.53)  0.248  (3.64) 0.908   (155.14)
0.696 0.726 0.640 0.024 0.779
1996 0.746  (13.71) 0.809  (23.10) 0.717   (17.88) -0.543  (-1.99) 0.841   (115.63)
0.588 0.678 0.625 0.002 0.710
1997 0.782  (14.28) 0.840  (26.48) 0.646   (15.05) 0.820   (105.95)
0.624 0.715 0.483 0.675
1998 0.731  (14.06) 0.783  (18.92) 0.650   (15.70) 0.785     (93.65)
0.529 0.602 0.431 0.633
These are coefficients from regressions where the dependent variable is the later year competition measure and
the independent variable is the 1992 value of the competition measure. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the
R-squared statistics are in the line below.29
Table 4. Means of Variables
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Yt (mln 1992 rubles) 897 906,400
Transport 0.392 0.212
Kt (mln 1992 rubles) 2,254 114,000
L1t 621 1,944
F
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
o
f
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
L2t 171 540
MuniGovt 0.015
RegGovt 0.057
FedGovt 0.099
MixedOwnt 0.430
Privatet 0.391
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
Foreignt 0.008
Military 0.032
ExpShare93 0.023 0.081
F
i
r
m
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
Profit92 0.223 0.163
IndGrowtht -0.219 0.316
RegGrowtht -0.114 0.128
D
e
m
a
n
d
S
h
o
c
k
s
PriceCht 0.460 0.573
Survivalt 0.870
Plants93 1.271 2.894
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
Subsidiary93 0.021
These means are calculated from the sample used in the regressions.30
Table 5. Survival Regression
Variable SURVIVAL
1-MixedHHI92 -0.087            (-4.35)
Imports92 -0.355            (-5.56)
LaborComp92 -0.006            (-0.28)
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
Transport -0.098            (-2.65)
MuniGov93 0.222            (5.17)
RegGov93 0.159             (6.63)
MixedOwn93 0.135             (7.31)
Private93 -0.100            (-4.60)
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
(
F
e
d
G
o
v
9
3
O
m
i
t
t
e
d
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
)
Foreign93 -0.336            (-2.80)
Military -0.590          (-18.37)
ExpShare93 0.208             (1.98)
Profit92 0.498           (10.21)
F
i
r
m
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
Emp92 0.404           (38.38)
IndGrowtht 0.084             (3.09)
RegGrowtht 0.241             (2.71)
D
e
m
a
n
d
S
h
o
c
k
s
PriceCht 0.264             (1.74)
Plants93 -0.055            (-2.67)
E
x
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
Subsidiary93 -0.994          (-25.31)
1994 -0.710            (-4.92)
1995 -1.067            (-5.52)
1996 -1.371            (-6.06)
1997 -1.620            (-6.82)
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
(
1
9
9
3
 
O
m
i
t
t
e
d
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
)
1998 -0.823            (-3.43)
Constant 0.344             (1.34)
Pseudo R
2 0.212
N 84,841
This is a pooled probit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy for survival (i.e., with non-missing
data in the given year), separately for survival in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively.
ConShare, the consumer goods share of total output, and branch dummies are also included. The z statistics,
using Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses.31
Table 6. Basic Regressions
Variable Equation (4) Equation (4) with
random effects
Equation (5) Equation (5) with
random effects
1-MixedHHI 0.141            (5.41) 0.142           (2.65) 0.358            (6.93) 0.301           (2.86)
Imports 0.209            (5.59) 0.143           (1.89) 0.760            (5.81) 0.531           (2.01)
LaborComp 0.281          (20.22) 0.288         (10.50) 0.262          (16.92) 0.279           (9.07)
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
Transport 0.359          (15.88) 0.332           (7.41) 0.270            (9.80) 0.268           (4.87)
Kt -1.165         (-17.39) -1.282        (-10.31) -1.165         (-17.39) -1.282        (-10.31)
L1t -0.591           (-4.40) 1.066           (4.60) -0.591           (-4.40) 1.066           (4.60)
L2t 1.903          (12.89) 1.200           (4.55) 1.903          (12.89) 1.200           (4.55)
Kt
2 0.181          (21.15) 0.252         (16.16) 0.181          (21.15) 0.252         (16.16)
L1t
2 0.033            (0.86) 0.165           (2.40) 0.033            (0.86) 0.165           (2.40)
L2t
2 -0.116           (-2.82) -0.102          (-1.27) -0.116           (-2.82) -0.102          (-1.27)
Kt*L1t 0.024            (1.46) -0.158          (-5.75) 0.024            (1.46) -0.158          (-5.75)
Kt*L2t -0.179         (-10.33) -0.110          (-3.60) -0.179         (-10.33) -0.110          (-3.60)
F
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
L1t*L2t 0.160            (4.68) 0.126           (1.91) 0.160            (4.68) 0.126           (1.91)
MuniGov 0.187            (6.03) 0.063           (1.83) 0.189            (6.08) 0.062           (1.81)
RegGov 0.028            (1.40) 0.047           (2.27) 0.016            (0.78) 0.037           (1.77)
MixedOwn 0.184          (13.02) 0.078           (5.59) 0.170          (11.84) 0.068           (4.61)
Private 0.258          (17.17) 0.132           (8.08) 0.246          (16.10) 0.123           (7.25)
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
(
F
E
D
G
O
V
 
O
m
i
t
t
e
d
Foreign 0.200            (3.48) 0.201           (2.92) 0.159            (2.74) 0.175           (2.46)
Military -0.522         (-23.71) -0.546        (-13.18) -0.537         (-24.11) -0.557        (-13.24)
ExpShare93 -0.366           (-6.25) -0.264          (-2.31) -0.460           (-7.70) -0.331          (-2.83)
F
i
r
m
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
Profit92 0.680          (20.41) 0.712         (10.40) 0.648          (18.97) 0.690           (9.83)
IndGrowtht 0.312          (15.05) 0.110           (7.72) 0.319          (15.34) 0.116           (8.07)
RegGrowtht 0.573          (10.71) 0.031           (0.88) 0.557          (10.38) 0.018           (0.49)
D
e
m
a
n
d
S
h
o
c
k
s
PriceCht -0.726         (-19.89) -0.089          (-3.59) -0.793         (-20.76) -0.138          (-3.95)
1994 -1.106         (-28.24) -0.684        (-26.16) -1.132         (-28.77) -0.703        (-25.39)
1995 -1.879         (-38.23) -1.062        (-30.95) -2.052         (-36.12) -1.183        (-17.05)
1996 -2.293         (-39.93) -1.389        (-34.22) -2.528         (-36.22) -1.553        (-16.76)
1997 -2.595         (-43.01) -1.568        (-36.48) -2.832         (-39.18) -1.732        (-18.35)
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
(
1
9
9
3
 
O
m
i
t
t
e
d
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
)
1998 -2.606         (-42.51) -1.606        (-36.41) -2.826         (-39.28) -1.758        (-19.29)
SurvMills -0.0000005   (-2.51) -0.0000003  (-3.41) -0.0000005   (-2.51) -0.0000003  (-3.41)
Constant 13.803           (38.97) 10.082         (15.37) 13.786          (38.90) 10.060         (15.32)
R
2 0.582 0.575 0.582 0.575
N 78,112 78,112 78,112 78,112
The t statistics are reported in parentheses. They are based on White-corrected robust standard errors in the OLS specifications and they are
adjusted for clustering on the same firms across time in the random effects specifications. ConShare and industry group dummies are also
included. FedGov is the omitted ownership category. The marginal returns to Kt, L1t, and L2t are 0.433, 0.560, and 0.131, respectively, in the
OLS regressions and 0.458, 0.584, and 0.130 in the random effects regressions.32
Table 7. The Effects of Competition on Performance Over Time
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1-MixedHHI -0.075 -0.055 0.099 0.233 0.245 0.260
(-1.87) (-1.17) (1.91) (4.15) (3.97) (3.45)
Imports 0.361 0.255 0.241 0.279 0.373 0.419
(6.65) (3.67) (3.12) (3.27) (4.07) (4.01)
LaborComp 0.339 0.326 0.279 0.240 0.253 0.329
(13.95) (10.75) (8.73) (7.21) (6.64) (6.80)
Transport 0.273 0.395 0.422 0.284 0.178 0.427
E
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
4
´
)
(6.60) (7.62) (7.76) (4.88) (2.82) (5.77)
1-MixedHHI 0.153 0.137 0.338 0.448 0.460 0.509
(2.66) (2.16) (4.99) (6.20) (5.94) (5.66)
Imports 1.191 0.899 0.969 0.844 0.913 1.081
(9.05) (6.67) (7.06) (6.00) (6.33) (7.15)
LaborComp 0.313 0.314 0.262 0.227 0.235 0.308
(12.20) (9.87) (7.78) (6.48) (5.91) (6.07)
Transport 0.163 0.327 0.344 0.223 0.104 0.327
E
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
5
´
)
(3.79) (6.12) (6.16) (3.74) (1.61) (4.32)
The t statistics, using White-corrected robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. All other variables in
the basic Equation (4) reported in column 1 of Table 6 are also included. These regressions use a balanced panel
of 10,237 enterprises with data in all years, adding to 61,422 total observations. The R
2 in both regressions is
0.598.
Table 8. Non-Linear Effects of Competition on Performance
Competition Variable Equation (4) Equation (5)
1-MixedHHI -0.249           (-2.84) 0.007            (0.06)
(1-MixedHHI)
2 0.371            (4.09) 0.370            (4.08)
Imports 0.362            (8.76) 1.162            (8.38)
Imports
2 -0.512           (-4.92) -0.484           (-4.69)
LaborComp 0.019            (0.23) -0.033           (-0.38)
LaborComp
2 0.269            (3.41) 0.268            (3.40)
Transport -0.207           (-2.01) -0.334           (-3.19)
Transport
2 0.513            (5.74) 0.513            (5.74)
The t statistics, using White-corrected robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. All other variables in
the basic Equation (4) reported  in column 1 of Table 6 are also included.33
Table 9.  Robustness Checks
Equation (4) Equation (5)
Panel A:  Alternative Domestic Product Market Competition Measures
Specification
1-MixedCR2 0.138                 (5.61) 0.253          (6.29)
1-NatHHI 0.023                 (0.29) 0.019          (0.18)
1-NatCR2 0.124                 (3.27) 0.161          (3.35)
1-RegHHI 0.039                 (2.51) 0.097          (4.77)
1-RegCR2 0.086                 (4.86) 0.160          (7.03)
1-MixedHHI*Imports 0.180                 (3.62) 0.541          (3.66)
1-NatHHI -0.098                (-1.16) -0.063         (-0.59)
1-RegHHI 0.046                 (2.80) 0.100          (4.80)
1-Gini 0.916               (17.62) 1.243        (17.96)
Nat No. Firms 0.033                 (7.91) 0.036          (7.11)
1-PAMixedHHI -0.030                (-1.33)
1-MixedMktSh 0.130                 (5.15) 0.226          (5.81)
1-NatMktSh 0.403                 (4.03) 0.542          (4.06)
1-RegMktSh 0.042                 (2.91) 0.082          (4.65)
Panel B: Least Absolute Deviation Estimation Technique
1-MixedHHI 0.234               (11.60) 0.563        (16.17)
Imports 0.316                 (9.90) 1.258        (12.27)
LaborComp 0.242               (17.72) 0.202        (14.20)
Transport 0.325               (15.24) 0.182          (7.85)
Panel C: Specification with Factors Interacted with Industry Group Dummies
1-MixedHHI 0.200                 (8.98) 0.394          (9.25)
Imports 0.129                 (3.28) 0.652          (5.02)
LaborComp 0.251               (18.18) 0.239        (15.65)
Transport 0.372               (16.59) 0.297        (11.15)
The t statistics, using White-corrected robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. All other variables in
the basic Equation (4) reported  in column 1 of Table 6 are also included. The HHI*Imports specification does
not include Imports by itself and the regional specifications do not include Transport.34
 Table 10.  Competition and Transportation Infrastructure Quality
Variable Equation (4) Equation (5)
Interacting Transport with Competition Measures
1-MixedHHI -0.100            (-1.95) 0.203             (3.01)
1-MixedHHI *Transport 0.675             (5.33) 0.449             (3.37)
Imports 0.079             (1.09) 0.963             (7.08)
Imports*Transport 0.345             (2.18) -0.515            (-4.89)
LaborComp 0.375           (12.60) 0.355           (11.12)
LaborComp*Transport -0.276            (-3.61) -0.273            (-3.38)
Transport 0.027             (0.19) 0.294             (2.00)
Using Transport to Define Market Size:  HHI
1-TransportMixedHHI 0.100             (4.82) 0.170             (6.90)
Using Transport to Define Market Size:  CR2
1-TransportMixedCR2 0.201             (9.75) 0.269           (11.38)
The t statistics, using White-corrected robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses.  All other variables in
the basic Equation (4) reported in column 1 of Table 6 are also included, with the exception of Transport in the
latter two specifications (due to collinearity with the mixed transport competition measures).35
Table 11. Ownership Effects
OLS OLS with Selection Correction Random Effects Random Effects with Selection
Correction
Non-State 0.190 (16.67) 0.036   (1.68) 0.076  (6.26) 0.054   (2.55)
MuniGov 0.187   (6.03) 0.371    (9.02) 0.063   (1.83) 0.140    (2.90)
RegGov 0.028   (1.40) 0.253    (7.44) 0.047   (2.27) 0.149    (4.18)
MixedOwn 0.184 (13.02) 0.104    (3.70) 0.078   (5.59) -0.006   (-0.21)
Private 0.258 (17.17) 0.163    (6.25) 0.132   (8.08) 0.065    (2.25)
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
Foreign 0.200   (3.48) 0.315    (4.79) 0.201   (2.92) 0.202    (2.67)
Non-State -0.010  (-6.07) -0.002  (-1.52)
State 0.234   (9.51) 0.035   (1.43)
MuniGov 0.018    (0.41) -0.005  (-0.14)
RegGov -0.036   (-1.58) -0.027  (-1.22)
FedGov 0.205  (13.84) 0.067   (4.47)
MixedOwn 0.206  (15.06) 0.114   (8.01)
Private 0.311  (19.30) 0.138   (7.20)
M
i
l
l
s
 
R
a
t
i
o
s
Foreign 0.663    (3.88) 0.352   (2.32)
The t statistics, using White-corrected robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. The omitted ownership category in the aggregated specification is state ownership
and the omitted category in the disaggregated specification is federal state ownership. All other variables in the basic Equation (4) reported  in column 1 of Table 6 are also
included.37